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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALLSTATE INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
THOMAS F. THATCHER, KATHLYN J. 
THATCHER, 
Defendants/Appellants, 
and 
RICHARD GROW and TODD LLOYD, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Appellate Case No. 20060538 CA 
District Court Civil No. 050908816 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This action is within the original jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court, pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). The Utah Supreme Court assigned this case to the 
Court of Appeals on June 13, 2006, as authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Was the district court correct in ruling that Allstate Indemnity Company 
("Allstate") had no duty to defend the Thatchers in the lawsuit filed by Richard Grow 
and Todd Lloyd because the allegations in the complaint, if proven, were not covered 
under the Thatchers' homeowners' policy? 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Standard of Review: Rulings on summary judgment motions are reviewed for 
correctness. Fire Insurance Exchange v. Estate of Therkelsen, 2001 UT 48, | 11, 27 
P.3d 555. "Interpretation of the terms of a contract is a question of law; thus, the Court 
of Appeals accords the trial court's legal conclusions regarding the contract no deference 
and reviews them for correctness." Nova Casualty Company v. Able Construction, Inc., 
1999UT69,t6,983P.2d575. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, 
In May 2003, the Thatchers hired a company named Sport Court to build a sports 
court and fence on their property. After the sports court was constructed, it was 
discovered that a portion of the sports court and fence encroached upon a portion of the 
adjoining property owned by Richard Grow and Todd Lloyd ("Grow and Lloyd"). In 
addition, Grow and Lloyd discovered that fill from the construction had been dumped on 
their property. Grow and Lloyd filed a lawsuit (the "Lawsuit") against the Thatchers, 
stating that the Thatchers had refused to remove the structures from their property and 
bring it into compliance with applicable zoning laws. As a result, Grow and Lloyd 
suffered damages because they were unable to sell the lot and the home they had built on 
it for a prospective buyer. Initially, the Thatchers personally hired an attorney to defend 
them in the lawsuit but on April 14, 2005, they tendered their defense to Allstate under 
their homeowners' policy (the "Policy"). 
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After investigation, Allstate determined that the Policy did not provide coverage 
for the claimed losses in the Lawsuit and therefore, Allstate was not obligated to pay for 
a defense or indemnification losses claimed in the Lawsuit. This information was 
conveyed to the Thatchers in a letter dated May 5, 2005. Allstate then filed a declaratory 
judgment action, which is the subject of this appeal, to determine whether the Thatchers 
had any right to a defense or indemnification under the Policy. In the meantime, Allstate 
agreed to defend the Thatchers in the Lawsuit under a reservation of rights until the court 
ruled as to whether or not the Thatchers' losses were covered under the Policy, thus 
triggering Allstate's duty to defend. 
It is important to note that since this appeal was filed, the Lawsuit was dismissed, 
sua sponte, on October 30, 2006. (See Addendum.) Upon learning of the dismissal, 
Allstate's counsel spoke to counsel for Grow and Lloyd who was unaware of the 
dismissal and indicated that he would try to get the dismissal set aside. As it stands 
today, even though Allstate has been providing a defense in the Lawsuit since the 
defense was tendered to them by the Thatchers, any continuing duty to defend, as well as 
this appeal, may rendered moot by the dismissal of the Lawsuit. 
Course of Proceedings. 
Allstate filed a Complaint for a Declaratory Judgment on May 13, 2005 and then 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on September 12, 2005. The Thatchers 
responded with their own Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on October 25, 2005. 
A hearing was held on March 13, 2006, before Judge Stanton Taylor, who was filling in 
for Judge Stephen Roth. Judge Taylor ruled from the bench in favor of Allstate. The 
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Thatchers filed a Motion for New Trial on March 24, 2006, which was denied by the 
court in an order entered on May 9, 2006. This appeal followed. 
Disposition. 
The trial court granted Allstate's Motion for Summary Judgment and declared 
that Allstate has no duty to defend or Indemnify under the Policy. The trial court also 
denied the Thatchers' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On January 31, 2003, Allstate and the Thatchers entered into an agreement 
whereby Allstate agreed to provide homeowners' insurance to the Thatchers for their 
residential property. (R. 12) On or about November 26, 2003, Grow and Lloyd, owners 
of a parcel of property adjacent to the Thatchers' property, filed the Lawsuit against the 
Thatchers. (R. 49-52) In the Lawsuit, Grow and Lloyd allege that the Thatchers, without 
a permit, built a sports court and fence that encroached on their property. (R. 50) Grow 
and Lloyd also allege that the Thatchers unlawfully deposited fill on their property. (R. 
50) The encroachment occurred while Grow and Lloyd were building a custom home 
under contract for a specific buyer. (R. 50) They demanded that the Thatchers move the 
encroachment but the Thatchers refused. (R. 50) Grow and Lloyd also allege that the 
Thatchers knew they were in danger of losing the contract and that their continued refusal 
to remove the encroachment would likely result in the loss of the sale. (R. 50) As a 
result of the encroachment and the refusal by the Thatchers to remove the encroachment, 
Grow and Lloyd lost the sale. (R. 50). 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Grow's and Lloyd's cause of action is intentional trespass resulting from the 
Thatchers knowingly and intentionally encroaching on their property in the first place and 
then intentionally refusing to remove the encroachment and bring the structure into 
compliance with applicable zoning laws. (R. 51) 
The Thatchers contacted Allstate regarding the Lawsuit and tendered their defense 
to Allstate on or about April 14,2005. Allstate reviewed the allegations in the Lawsuit to 
determine whether the Policy provided coverage for the claims and on May 5, 2005, 
Allstate sent the Thatchers a letter (the "Letter") explaining why the Policy does not 
provide coverage for the claimed losses in the Lawsuit and therefore, that Allstate is not 
obligated to pay for a defense in that Lawsuit or to pay indemnification losses claimed in 
the Lawsuit. (R. 53-7) In that Letter, Allstate agreed to defend the Thatchers in the 
Lawsuit under a reservation of rights until the court ruled, in this declaratory judgment 
action, as to whether or not the Thatchers are entitled to a defense and indemnification 
under the Policy. (R. 53-7) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under any construction of the facts alleged in the underlying complaint, Allstate 
does not have a duty to defend. The Thatchers do not dispute that property damage 
occurred nor do they dispute that building the sports court and fence were intentional 
acts. The crux of the case boils down to two issues: (1) Whether the property damage 
caused by the Thatchers, as alleged in the underlying complaint, can be construed as an 
"accident" and therefore, covered under the Policy; and (2) whether the results of the 
Thatchers' actions fall under the exclusions for covered losses. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
ALLSTATE HAS NO DUTY TO DEFEND BECAUSE THE 
UNDERLYING CLAIMS, IF PROVEN, WOULD NOT BE COVERED 
UNDER THE POLICY. 
The district court was correct in ruling that Allstate had no duty to defend the 
Thatchers in the Lawsuit initiated against them by Grow and Lloyd because the claims in 
the Lawsuit, if proven, would not fall under the terms of the Policy. An insurer's duty to 
defend is based on the language of the policy and the nature of the claim against the 
insured; a defense duty arises when the insurer ascertains facts giving rise to potential 
liability under the insurance policy. Sharon Steel Corp, v. Aetna Casualty and Surety 
Co., 931 P.2d 127, 133 (Utah 1997) (citing Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, v. 
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 714 P.2d 1143, 1146 (Utah 1986)). This potential 
obligation is determined by referring to the allegations in the underlying complaint. Id. 
When those allegations, if proved, could result in liability under the policy, then the 
insurer has a duty to defend. Id. 
An insurer denying a duty to defend must establish that the claims fall outside the 
coverage of the policy or the claims are exempted from coverage. Id. (citations omitted). 
The duty to defend is determined by comparing the language of the policy with the 
allegations in the complaint and is determined by the terms of the policy, not by the 
expectations of the insured. Id. (emphasis added). See also Pixton v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746 (Utah App. 1991). As shown below, there are 
several reasons why Allstate does not have a duty to defend based on the terms of the 
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Policy. 
A. The Allegations in the Underlying Complaint Do Not Constitute An 
Accident And Therefore, Are Not An Occurrence Covered by the 
Policy. 
In order for the Thatcher's encroachment, or trespass, to be covered under the 
Policy, it must be considered an occurrence. "Occurrence" is defined in paragraph 9 of 
Definitions Used In This Policy as: 
"Occurrence" - means an accident, including continuous or 
repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful 
conditions during the policy period, resulting in bodily injury or 
property damage. 
(R. 107) (emphasis added). To fall within the policy's definition of occurrence, and thus 
within the scope of coverage, the property damage must have resulted from an 
"accident." Under this analysis, the question then becomes whether the focus should be 
on the intentional act of building the sports court or as the Thatchers argue, the 
unintended result of encroaching on their neighbor's property. 
In determining whether an act was sudden and accidental, it is the nature of the 
act itself, and not the result, that must be analyzed. Fire Insurance Exchange v. 
Rosenberg, 930 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Utah App 1997), overruled in part by Benjamin v. 
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 UT 37, f 23, n.3, 140 P.3d 1210. The Thatchers rely on a 
variety of cases from other jurisdictions to support their position that negligent 
trespassing is covered by the Policy but the Court is not obligated to follow those cases. 
In Deseret Savings, the court relied on a Nebraska case in which an insured 
constructed a warehouse in the flood plain of a creek. In a suit brought by a nearby 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
property owner to declare the warehouse a nuisance and remove it, the court held that the 
insurer could have no liability under the policy since any resulting damage would be 
intended and thus not an "occurrence," even though its owner had no intention of 
causing harm to nearby properties. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, v. United 
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 714 P.2d 1143, 1146 (Utah 1986)(citing Millard Warehouse 
Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 283 N.W.2d 56 (Neb. 1979) (emphasis added). 
More importantly, the Millard court noted that "where acts are voluntary and 
intentional and injury is the natural result, the result was not caused by an 
"accident" even though the result might have been unexpected, unforeseen, and 
unintended." Millard, 283 N.W.2d at 62-63 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The 
Millard court further reasoned that "the lack of intent to do harm on the part of the 
actor does not by itself compel conclusion that result was caused by "accident" for 
purposes of liability policy" and added that "[a]n effect which is the natural and 
probably consequence of an intentional act or of a course of action is not an 
"'accident/" Id. (emphasis added). 
At issue in Green v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, 2005 UT App 564, 
127 P.3d 1279 was whether a subdivision developers' failure to disclose the risk of a 
landslide to a subdivision lot purchaser was covered under the developer's insurance 
policy. The court held that the failure to disclose the risk, whether intentional or 
negligent, was not an "occurrence" within the meaning of the policy, and thus the insurer 
owed no duty to defend. Id. An insurer's duty to defend is measured by the nature and 
kinds of risks covered by the policy and arises whenever the insurer ascertains facts 
8 
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which give rise to potential liability under the policy. Id. at % 32. 
However, it is irrelevant whether the Thatchers were negligent or intentional in 
their encroachment. The Thatchers' alleged lack of intent still does not qualify their 
actions as accidental and therefore, an occurrence, requiring a defense or insurance 
coverage. 
B. The Thatchers' Intentional Acts Are Excluded From Coverage Even If 
the Results of Their Actions Are Unintended or Unforeseeable. 
Although Allstate asserts that it has no obligation to defend the Thatchers in the 
Lawsuit because the underlying allegations, if proven, would not result in liability under 
the Policy, the Thatchers argue that their actions constitute negligence and therefore, an 
"accident" covered under the Policy. Even if the Thatchers' trespass was negligent, the 
consequences of their actions are still not covered under the Policy. 
The Policy excludes coverage for intentional acts even if the damage is different 
than reasonably expected: 
9. Intentional or criminal acts of or at the direction of any 
insured person, if the loss that occurs: 
a) may be reasonably expected to result from such acts; 
or 
b) is the intended result of such acts. 
(R. 110) The Policy also states the following regarding intentional acts: 
Losses We Do Not Cover Under Coverage X: 
1. We do not cover any bodily injury or property damage 
intended by, or which may reasonably be expected to result 
from the intentional or criminal acts or omissions of, any 
insured person. This exclusion applies even if: 
a) such insured person lacks the mental capacity to govern his or 
her conduct; 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
b) such bodily injury or property damage is of a different 
kind or degree than intended or reasonably expected; or 
c) such bodily injury or property damage is sustained by a 
different person than intended or reasonably expected. 
(R. 123) (emphasis addedd). It is clear under the Policy that intentional acts are not 
covered, even if the result was different from what was expected or reasonably foreseen 
by the Thatchers. 
The Thatchers argue that even though their actions in building the sports court was 
intentional, the resulting damage to the adjoining property was unintentional. The 
Thatchers also argue that unforeseen consequences of intentional acts qualify as 
accidents. The Thatchers rely on Fire Insurance Exchange v. Rosenberg. Their reliance 
is misplaced. 
In Rosenberg, the court concluded that all unintentional or accidental acts resulting 
in injury are considered accidents constituting occurrences under liability insurance 
policies. Id. at 1204-05. The court further explained that an injury caused by an 
intentional act may also be considered an accident constituting an occurrence under a 
liability insurance policy if the injury could not be "reasonably anticipated or expected" 
from the deliberate act. Id. at 1205-06. 
However in Benjamin, which overruled Rosenberg in part, the court, examined 
Rosas v. Eyre, 2003 UT App 414, 82 P.3d 185 {overruled in part by Benjamin v. Arnica 
Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 UT 37, % 23, n.3, 140 P.3d 1210) with regard to the duty to defend. 
In Rosas, the court held that an insurer had no duty to defend an assault claim brought 
against its insured because "the facts alleged in the complaint clearly demonstrate that a 
10 
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cause of action based solely on an intentional tort was intended.5' Id. at % 23. (citations 
omitted). The Benjamin court emphasized that "the appropriate inquiry is whether the 
complaint alleges claims sounding in negligence. To the extent that the underlying facts 
in any given case do not satisfy the elements of a claim for negligence, the negligence 
claim will be subject to dismissal." Id. at % 23, n.3. In Benjamin and Rosas, the 
complaint asserted alternative claims sounding in both intentional tort and negligence. 
That is not the situation here. 
The important distinction that is similar to the complaint filed by Grow and Lloyd 
is the allegation of the tort of intentional trespass. The allegations in the Lawsuit describe 
only intentional acts in that the Thatchers refused to remove the sports court and fence 
despite being asked to do so, both by Salt Lake City (for failing to comply with zoning 
regulations) and by Grow and Lloyd. Grow and Lloyd have not alleged a separate, 
alternative claim for relief sounding in negligence and it is not the function of the court in 
this declaratory judgment action to resolve the claims in the Lawsuit. The complaint in 
the Lawsuit must be taken at face value. Therefore, there are no negligence allegations or 
claims in the Lawsuit and intentional acts are clearly not covered by the Policy, either as 
an accident or under the intentional acts exclusion. 
The Thatchers do not dispute that building the sports court was intentional. Even 
if the encroachment was negligent and therefore different from what was expected or 
reasonably foreseen, the resulting damage is still not covered under the Policy. The 
Thatchers also argue that they relied on Sport Court to determine the property line and 
get the necessary permits. This still does not bring the Thatchers' actions under Policy 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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coverage because the Thatchers directed the building of the sports court, even though the 
act of building the sports court was performed by someone else. 
II. THE COURT'S DECISION WAS WELL-REASONED AND 
SHOULD STAND. 
Finally, the Thatchers argue that the trial court relied on an isolated sentence in 
Green v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. to determine that the claims alleged in the 
Lawsuit must be construed as an intentional act and not an "occurrence." The Thatchers 
claim that the court erroneously applied current case law in reaching its decision. 
However, the Green case was not the deciding factor in the court's decision but merely 
the most recent case in a line of well-developed case law in Utah regarding the issues 
surrounding an insurer's duty to defend and indemnify. There is no evidence that the 
trial court relied exclusively on Green in making its decision. The court correctly ruled 
that the placement of the sports court and fence by the Thatchers was an intentional act, 
precluding coverage under the Policy. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the terms of the Policy, Allstate does not have a duty to defend the 
Thatchers in the Lawsuit. The complaint in the lawsuit alleges that the Thatchers 
"knowingly and intentionally" trespassed on Grow's and Lloyd's property. The 
complaint also alleges that this trespass occurred because of the Thatchers' intentional 
acts. It is important to note that the complaint alleges that the Thatchers' failure to 
remove the sports court and fence once they discovered it was on the adjoining property 
caused the damages to Grow and Lloyd. This continued intentional encroachment is 
12 
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what led to devaluation of the adjoining property and potential profit from the sale of the 
property. These intentional acts are simply not occurrences covered under the Policy. 
Even though, as the Thatchers claim, these intentional acts produced unintended results, 
it falls under the exclusions listed in the Policy. Finally, the Lawsuit was dismissed on 
October 30, 2006, rendering the issue of whether Allstate has a duty to defend and this 
appeal moot unless counsel in the Lawsuit refiles a complaint or gets the dismissal set 
aside. As of today, neither event has happened. Allstate respectfully requests that this 
Court affirm the decision of the trial court in favor of Allstate. 
Dated this 15th day of November, 2006. 
DUNN & DUNN, P.C. 
l^XkJlMA^ 
Tim Dalton Dunn 
Kathleen M. Liuzzi 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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I hereby certify that on November 15, 2006, two copies of the foregoing was 
served by U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
D. Scott Crook 
J. Craig Smith 
Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC 
215 South State Street, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellants Thomas and 
Kathlyn Thatcher 
Cameron M. Hancock 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, P.C. 
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and Todd Lloyd 
Legal Secretary 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD GROW, : ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : Case No: 030926692 MI 
THOMAS THATCHER, : Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
Defendant. : Date: October 30,2006 
Based on the failure of the parties and/or counsel to respond to 
the Order to Show Cause, the Court orders this case be dismissed 
without prejudice. 
Dated this %£} day of tjcAcfhpS , 2 0 £Lg-
Paqe 1 (last) 
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